

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

Washington, D.C. 20505

25 November 1980

ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT : Poland

The Polish leadership is facing its gravest challenge since the strikes on the Baltic Coast in August. I am concerned the Kania regime may resort to force. The present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion.

25X1

25X1

✓ Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

25X1

25X1

NI-IAM-80-10010

25X1

33

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET ☐

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

25 November 1980

ALERT MEMORANDUM\*

Poland

*The Polish leadership is facing the gravest challenge to its authority since the strikes on the Baltic Coast ended in August. The Warsaw leaders of the Solidarity Trade Unions have issued a list of six political demands and threatened a large-scale strike in Warsaw factories if the regime fails to begin talks on these demands by Thursday noon. It will be difficult for the regime to acquiesce to the union demands, especially in view of the Tass warning on Monday against a railway strike, and of the political quality of the present demands. Thus the present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion.* ☐

25X1

The Polish leadership is facing the gravest challenge to its authority since the strikes on the Baltic Coast ended in August. According to Reuters' reports, the Warsaw leaders of the Solidarity Trade Unions have issued a list of six political demands, and threatened a large-scale strike in Warsaw factories if the regime fails to begin talks on these demands by Thursday noon. The Warsaw union demands include:

*\*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of impending potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. Because of time criticality this memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence community.* ☐

25X1

25X1

NI-1AM-80-10010

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

TOP SECRET ☐

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

- the release of the printer arrested and charged with betraying State secrets by copying a document which deals with official policy on dissidents;
- the naming of the authors of the document on dissidents;
- the release of jailed dissidents;
- an official investigation of the people responsible for suppressing demonstrating workers during labor protests in 1970 and 1976;
- the establishment of a joint Government-Solidarity Parliamentary Commission to investigate the powers of the police;
- the limiting of the State budget for the prosecutor's office.

This new confrontation comes at an already tense time with reported strikes on November 25th by railway workers in Gdansk and Warsaw, workers in several factories in the Capital and in Lodz, and by coal miners in Silesia. ☐

25X1

It will be difficult for the regime to acquiesce to the union demands, especially in view of the Tass warning on Monday against a railway strike, and of the political quality of the present demands. If its past responses to such crises provide an indication, the regime will try to buy time, possibly by undertaking negotiations in the hope of splitting the National Solidarity leadership, bringing pressure by moderate union leaders and the Church to bear, and seeking a compromise solution. ☐

25X1

In the event strikes in Warsaw ensue, similar work actions are likely to spread throughout Poland. In these circumstances the Kania regime would have a high incentive to use limited force in an effort to reestablish its political authority, to stave off a Soviet intervention, and in the hopes of preempting wide-spread violence. Such a limited use of force would probably include the arrest of militant union leaders and dissidents and the declaration of a state of national emergency. The resort to force could, however, provoke the very disorder the regime seeks to avoid. ☐

25X1

While the Soviets will allow the Polish regime some time to contain the situation, these developments will serve to convince the Soviets that, unless the unions can be made to go back to work peacefully, coercive measures either on the part of the Polish leadership or the Soviets themselves will eventually have to be employed. Thus the present situation moves us closer to a possible Soviet military invasion. ☐

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020005-9